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ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage
result from joint consumption of household public goods. Assuming a class of utility functions
which guarantee transferable utility within marriage, the paper proves that marriage markets will
be characterized by positive assortative mating on income. A tendency for positive assortative
mating on wages is also demonstrated, contrasting with Becker's predictions for marriages based
on gains from specialization. The implications of the results for empirical analysis of household
composition decisions are explored. An econometric technique is developed to deal with a wide class
of problems in which the behavior of two agents depends on the dispersion in some characteristic.
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Introduction
E conomists have increasingly recognized that decisions about household living arrangements,
such as when and whom individuals marry, the age at which children leave home, and the sharing
of living quarters by children and their elderly parents, should be explicitly modeled as choice
variables in the analysis of many economic and demographic issues. Household composition may
in fluence individual labor supply and consumption decisions because of direct effects on tax rates
or eligibility for government transfer programs, or because of indirect effects on relative shadow
prices due to joint consumption economies or returns to specialization. Analysts of government
welfare programs are especially aware of the importance of household composition, and many have
iodeled household living arrangement decisions as one part of a complete set of joint decisions
which simultaneously determine labor supply, program participation, and living arrangements.
As economists move in the direction of explicitly modeling joint decisions about household
formation and internal household allocations, a number of difficult theoretical and empirical is-
sutes arise. This paper focuses attention on a relatively unexplored set of issues resulting from the
role of household public goods in the determination of optimal living arrangements and consump-
tion allocations. The economies in household size estimated in the household equivalence scale
literature' suggest that some form of joint consumption economies are an important component
of household consumption. This paper explores the implications of household public goods for the
extent and direction of assortative mating in joint household formation. Although the theoreti-
cal results are developed for the specific case of marriage markets, the results are shown to have
implications for all living arrangements decisions. The paper exploits a class of utility functions
which allow transferable utility in the presence of a public good, making it possible to characterize
the joint payoffs from all possible combinations of partners without making any assumptions about
the intra-household division of utility or about the nature of within household bargaining. The
properties of marriage assignments which are consistent with a competitive marriage market are
derived and used to characterize the extent and direction of assortative mating when there exist
household public goods. The results both extend and contrast with Becker's (1981) predictions
about assortative mating, with the most important difference being a prediction of positive, rather
than negative, assortative mating on wages.
An important implication of the paper's theoretical results is that dispersion in the character-
istics of potential housemates will be an important determinant of the probability of marriage or
the formation of other joint living arrangements. Specification of a simple empirical model demon-
strates that serious econometric problems result from the role of dispersion in characteristics. The
effects of dispersion will in general be difficult to estimate or control for in empirical work whenever
the characteristics of potential housemates are unobserved for individuals who do not form joint
households. The paper demonstrates that estimation techniques such as conventional multi-stage
solutions to selectivity bias cannot be applied to cases in which the dispersion of characteristics are
important. A general econometric solution to these problems is developed which explicitly accounts
SSee, for example, Lazear and Michael (1980), Maiellbauer (1977), and Pollak and Wales (1981).
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for the unknown sample separation problem caused by dependence of behavior on the dispersion
in unobserved characteristics.
The likelihood function for the general problem is derived, providing a simple demonstration
that the parameters cannot be estimated using multi-stage single eqation procedures, and demon-
strating the potentially misleading nature of estimates based on linear parameterizations that do
not recognize dispersion of characteristics. The procedure allows maximum likelihood estimation of
structural parameters which have straightforward interpretations in a theoretical model of house-
holds formation based on public goods. The estimation strategy applies to to a wide class of
problems in which behavior depends on the dispersion in characteristics among two agents, one of
whom is observed only for particular values of some structural equation.
1. Household Formation and Marriage Market Equilibrium
Researchers on a wide variety of topics compare the economic behavior of married versus single
young adults, intact elderly couples versus widows, or grown children living at home versus grown
children living alone. While economists working in these areas have recognized the importance of
making household living arrangements endogenous, there has been little theoretical guidance on
appropriate empirical specifications. The empirical implications of endogenous household composi-
tion cannot be understood in the absence of theoretical guidance on the choice of household living
arrangements.
Becker's (1973, 1974, 1981) seminal work on the economics of marriage and the family provides
an important foundation for analysis of marriage markets and household formation. Becker's results
include characterizations of the properties of marriage market equilibria, including predictions about
assortative mating on spouses' traits. One of the limitations of Becker's approach to the economics
of marriage is the inability to incorporate joint consumption economies into his analysis. Becker was
able to derive simple characterizations of equilibrium assignments in a competitive marriage market
by assuming a single composite commodity, a restriction which guarantees transferable utility
between spouses. Gains to marriage in Becker's model result from specialization in home production
and market work, with all inputs used to produce a single private good which can be divided in
any way between spouses. Joint consumption is likely to be pervasive in households, however, and
to be a critical determinant of the gains to marriage and the formation of joint households. The
introduction of household public goods in any interesting way requires the existence of at least twp
goods, a modification which immediately complicates Becker's proofs of the properties of marriage
market equilibria.2
Although public goods cannot be readily incorporated into Becker's analysis, some of the basic
foundations of Becker's model of marriage markets based on cornparative advantage are also useful
for the analysis of a model based on household public goods. One central result draws dlirectly on1
Koopmans and Beckrnann's (1957) analysis of the problern of assigning frms to locations, which was
2 Examples of the problems caused by introducing multiple goods in Becker's model of the hlouseholdI cant he
found ini Bergstrom (1986) and Bernhbeirn, Shleifer, and Surnrers (1985), both papers demonstrating problems
ini extending Becker's Rotten 1(id Theorem to the case of multiple goods.
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in1sight fully borrowed by Becker (1981) for analysis of the marriage market. A useful reformulation
of this result is the following:
Proposition 1. If there exists a set of strictly increasing weighting functions gj such that g(U 2)+
gq (U;) equals some constant gij for all divisions of utility between potential partners i and j, then
any assignment of partners which is in the core must maximize EiES gi(Ui), where S is the set of
all potential partners.
Proof. Denote a permutation of males and females which maximizes >ig,(Ui) by P*, and arrange
the spouses in P* such that the ith male is married to the ith female, with corresponding utilities
denoted by U" and U=1, and with "weighting functions" g," and gf. Consider an alternative
assignment P in which individuals receive utilities j and Uf, with
g,"'(U,")+ Egf(Uf) > 1:g,"(OJ") + 1:gf(Of), (1)
iEM iEF iEM iEF
where M and F are the sets of all males and females respectively. The alternative assignment P
will be blocked by any male and female who would both receive higher utility married to each other
in P* than they receive in their marriages in P, i.e. if
U?" >U#& and Uf1 > U for some j. (2)
Given condition (1), it must be the case that there exists some j such that
g"(U ) + gf (UJ) > g'(#7) + g(Of). (3)
If g"'(U') + g (UJ) is constant for couple (j,j), implying that weighted utility is transferable one
to one between spouses by transfers of money, it follows that if (3) is true, then there exists some
division of utility such that
g'(Uj")'> g7"(Oj") and gf(Uf) > gf(O). (4)
But since gj is assumed to be increasing in U, it follows from (4) that (2) holds, and therefore that
permutation P cannot be in the core. This establishes Proposition 1. The usefulness of the result
will be seen below, where it will be shown that a particular class of utility functions will produce
the conditions necessary for the proposition to hold.
In Becker's model there exists a single aggregate commodity Z~g which is produced jointly by
spouses i and j according to a household production function. Given no restrictions on the division
of output withing marriage, the condition for optimal assignments in Becker's model is simply that
aggregate output be maximized, a straightforward reformulation of the Koopmans and Beckmann
assignment problem. Using this condition, Becker proves that positive assortative mating will
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characterize the efficient assignment of partners if
02F(Am,Af5)
> o0 (5)8 Am &A f
where F(.) is a household production function and Am and Af are the values for some quantitative
trait for the male and female partners.3
2. Assortative Mating on Income in Public Good Households
If the gains from forming combined households are entirely the result of capturing pure public
good economies, it is instructive to consider whether the optimal assignment of partners will be
characterized by positive assortative mating on income or other characteristics. Becker (1981: 81)
briefly mentions the implications of joint consumption in marriage assignments, suggesting that
there should be positive assortative mating on preferences in such a case. The role of income per
se is not discussed by Becker, however, and no formal analysis is provided of the role of joint
consumption.
Extending Becker's analysis of marriage market equilibrium and assortative mating to the case
of household public goods is difficult in the general case in which transferable utility is not imposed.
Given any arbitrary utility functions, there will in general be no simple characterization of the pay-
off of a potential marriage that is independent of the distribution of utility within the marriage.
If payoffs cannot be assigned to potential marriages independent of bargaining outcomes over the
surplus generated by the marriage then the convenient properties of the Koopmans-Beckmann
assignment problem cannot be exploited, and little can be said about marriage market equilibria.
Some structure can be regained by imposing specific bargaining solutions, as in Rochford's (1984)
proof of the existence of equilibrium under any symmetric pairwise bargaining solution. An alter-
native approach is taken in the analysis which follows. A class of utility functions is adopted which
make it possible to recover transferable utility in the presence of public goods. As proven below, it
is then possible to derive theoretical predictions about the nature of assortative mating in marriage
markets in the presence of household public goods. The results provide important extensions to
Becker's results and in some important cases provide contradictory theoretical predictions.
The fundamental assumption is that individuals have utility functions of the form shown by
Bergstrom and Cornes (1981, 1983) to be necessary and sufficient to make the efficient allocation of
public goods independent of the distribution of income. Specifically, individual i's utility is given
by
Ui(Y,X) = A(YV)XI + B(Y), (6 )
where Y' is the level of a household public good which can be jointly consumed, and( X, is in<(IividIIual
3 Proofs are given in Becker (1981: 70.72) and Sattinger (1975). Schirm (1986) demonstrates that the Becker
result based on a single trait need not hold in general when there are multiple traits.
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i's consumption of a private good.4 Analysis of (6) reveals that the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution of a group of individuals with this form of utility function depends only on the level of
the public good Y and the aggregate quantity of the private good X. For a group of individuals who
face the same price for the private good, it follows that the level of Y which satisfies the Samuelson
condition for the efficient level of the public good depends only on total income and prices and
is independent of the distribution of income. Utility of form (6) also implies that the sum of the
utilities of any group of individuals sharing the public good Y is independent of the distribution of
the private good. Utility is transferable across individuals at a one for one rate through transfers
of the private good.
Suppose individuals i and j, with incomes I; and Ij, combine into a single household, denoting
aggregate household quantities by I = I; + Ij and X = X; + X5. Since utility can be transferred one
to one between the two by allocations of the private good, it is efficient for the couple to maximize
joint utility U; + Uj. If the two face a budget constraint pY + wX = I, where p and w are the
market prices of the public and private goods respectively, then substituting the budget constraint
into the sum U; + U, their joint utility can be represented as
Z,,(Y,p,w,I) = U= +Uj = A(Y) [IpY]+ B(Y) + B(Y). (7)
The independence of the efficient level of public goods from the distribution of income (or utility) is
demonstrated by the fact that income appears in (7) only in terms of the total quantity I = I+ Ij.
The household's equilibrium consumption of both the public and private good can be determined
without resolving any bargaining problems over the distribution of utility.
Taking advantage of the transferable utility implied by (6), it follows from Proposition 1 that
i f utility is divided between spouses as the outcome of a competitive marriage market,5 then all sets
of marriage assignments which are in the core must have the property that they maximize =; U;
over all individuals i. The power of assuming utility of form (6) is that Becker's assumption of a
single composite commodity can be relaxed and household public goods can be introduced without
losing the transferable utility which makes the assignment problem tractable.6
In order to analyze the pure public good household, the household production function can
simply be thought of as the joint utility function in (7). The traits to be considered are the two
prospective partners' incomes, I; and I5. Since one partner's income is a perfect substitute for
the other's, the restatement of Becker's condition (5) for the case of positive assortative mating on
incomes is
4 While utility function (6) is obviously restrictive, it does not impose that preferences are identical or homothetic
and it allows quite general income and price elasticities which may differ greatly across individuals.
s Requiring that in equilibrium there cannot be two individuals who would both get higher atility married to
each other than they receive from their assigned spouses.
6 See Bergstrom (1986) for applications of this utility function to extensions of Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem.
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where V(.) is the indirect utility function implied by (7), i.e. V = maxy Zip(Y) subject to wX +
pY < I. Using condition (8), the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 2. If the efficient level of household public goods is independent of the distribu-
tion of income between spouses, then marriage market equilibrium will be characterized by positive
assortative mating on spouses' incomes.
Proof. To see whether condition (8) holds, Dote that (7) has been written to imply an unconstrained
maximum in Y, with first order condition
0Zi(Y,pWI) = A' - -A(Y)+ Bs+ B = 0, (9)OY w w
and second order condition
=A"X+B!'+B'---A'<0, (10)
8Y 2  t .7 w
where A' = }, A"= , etc. Denote the left hand side of the inequality in (10) by D, and note
that (9) implies Y as a function of I. By the implicit function theorem, the comparative static
result for the effect of income on household demand for the public good is
OY -A'
oT D
Since D < 0 by (10), 0Y/oI and A' must always be of the same sign.
Differentiating the household indirect utility function with respect to income, the first deriva-
tive is
9V Zi j0Y OZ*-- = -- + j= A. (12)
or BY 8I or
The first term in (12) disappears by first order condition (9), a standard implication of the envelope
theorem. The second derivative, then, is simply
0 2 V(I,p) _4YO8A
o2 =~1y (13)
By (11), the two terms in (13) will always be of the same sign, implying that 02/012 is
unambiguously positive as long as the income elasticity of demand for the public good is not zero.
Following Becker's theorern, then, since the indirect utility function is convex in income, positive
assortative mating on income will always be optimal when the gains from combining result strictly
from capturing public goods economies, given independence of the level of public goods from the
distribution of household income.
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3. Assortative Mating on Wages
The results above assume potential spouses bring some exogenous income endowment to the
marriage and that they pay the same price for the private good. It is more interesting to consider
the case in which spouses earn income at potentially different wages. In this case leisure can be
(efined as the private good and preferences can still be characterized by utility function (6). The
analysis is now complicated, however, by the fact that the two spouses face different prices for the
private good. The budget constraint is now
Ih + Ij +w=(T - Xi) + w,(T - X;) = pY, (14)
where w; is the ith person's wage, T is the maximum potential labor supply, and X; is the ith
person's consumption of leisure. Unlike the case in which the private good can be purchased at
a single price, utility under budget constraint (14) cannot be transferred between spouses one to
one, since an hour of leisure for the lower wage spouse can only be converted into less than an hour
of leisure for the other spouse. It is no longer the case, then, that joint utility for the couple is
independent of the distribution of utility. Substituting budget constraint (14) into utility function
(6), joint utility can now be written as
iI - pY W- - w;
Zij7 = A(Y ) - Xi(' ) + Bi(Y) + Bj(Y ), (15)
where I is the couple's full income, I = I= + Ij + T(wi + ivy). Comparing (15) with (7), note the
dependence of joint utility in (15) on the distribution of leisure between spouses. For any given
level of utility, it is clear from (15) that joint utility is maximized by giving all leisure to the lower
wage spouse. It is no longer true, then, that each party views maximization of joint utility as the
desirable outcome.
It remains true, however, that the efficient level of the public good is independent of the
distribution of income. Choosing Y to maximize one spouse's utility subject to a given level of
utility for the other gives first order condition
A'[wiXi + wXj] - pA(Y) + wiB + w jB =0, (16)
which can be shown to be the Samuelson efficiency condition when the private good is defined as
money rather than as leisure.7 Note that w=X= + wjXj = I - pY is simply the total dollar value of
leisure consumption in the marriage. It follows that (16), like the efficiency condition for the pure
endowment case in (9), can be solved to give the efficient level of the public good independent of
the distribution of the private good between the spouses.
7 Note that the marginal rate of transformation of money for the public good is the same for both spouses, even
though the marginal rate of transformation of leisure for the public good differs between spouses.
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The second order condition for the efficient level of Y is
A"(I-- pY)+wiB +BwjB' - 2pA' < 0, (17)
directly analogous to condition (10).
When individuals face Elifferent wages and view leisure as the private good in (6), the sum of
utilities of person i and person j sharing a public good will depend on the distribution of leisure.
The key to making further progress is to note that the wage-weighted sum of utilities is independent
of the distribution of leisure, however. The wage-weighted sum of utilities can be written as
w2Ui + wjUj = A(Y)['w Xi + w3Xj] + w1B (Y)+ wmBj(Y). (18)
Substituting from the budget constraint, the weighted sum reduces to
Z = A(Y)[I - pY]+wiBi(Y) + w 3Bj(Y). (19)
These results make it possible to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If utility is of form (6) and the benefits of marrying result entirely from sharing
household public goods, then when wages differ across the population, marriage market equilibrium
will be characterized by positive assortative mating on spouses' wages.
Proof. Since the wage-weighted sum of utilities is constant for any i and j who marry, it follows
from Proposition 1 that marriage assignments which are in the core must maximize the weighted
sum of utilities, E es 5 iU;, where the weights are individual wages and S is the set of all potential
spouses.8
The first order condition (16) for the efficient level of Y in a marriage in which spouses face
different wages implies Y as an implicit function of wi and wj, with
Y _-(A'T+B )
- (20)owz D2 '
where A' and B' are defined as before, and where D2 is the left hand side of (17) and is strictly
negative by second order conditions. It follows, then, that aY/o9wi must be of the same sign as
A'T+ Bl.
Since we have shown that the optimal assignment of spouses must maximize )'; w; U;, tlie
condition which determines whether there will be positive or negative assortative mating on wage
* Ini general, when individuals face different prices of the private good, the analogous result is to weight utility
functions by the individual prices of the private good. The previous results for the case of exogenous income
endowments are a special case, since the price of the private good is the same for all partners and hence the
equilibrium assignments maximize the unweighted sum of utilities.
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rates depends on the cross-partial derivatives of w;U, + w jU,. Let V2 = maxy Z (Y,p, wi, wj, I)
subject to the budget constraint (14). The appropriate extension of Becker's theorem is that there
will be positive assortative mating on wage rates if
Vwj> 0. (21)
Omiow;
Differentiating V2 with respect to wi,
_V2 _ z:;y Y OZ- 2 - -+ + = AT + B , (22)Ow 8Y 8m owwi
using the fact that 8Zi /8Y = 0 by first order conditions. The cross-partial derivative is
02 V2 BY
= - -[A'T + Bi] (23)
8miaw j owi
From (20), the two terms on the right hand side of (23) will always be of the same sign. This
implies that 82V2/Oi8w is unambiguously positive as long as the elasticity of demand for the
public good with respect to wages is not zero. Following Becker's theorem, then, Proposition 3 is
established. Positive assortative mating on wages will always be observed in equilibrium when the
gains from combining result strictly from capturing public goods economies, given independence of
the level of public goods from the distribution of household income.
Becker (1981) concluded from his analysis that negative assortative mating on wages should be
observed in marriage market equilibrium.9 The model developed here based on household public
goods, however, predicts positive assortative mating on wages. The difference results from the
different source of gains from marriage. When the gains result from specialization and comparative
advantage, as in Becker, it will often be optimal to match a spouse who has high market wages with
a mate who has low market wages and can specialize in home production. When the gains result
from joint consumption of goods which are purchased in the market, it is always optimal to match
spouses who have similar full incomes and therefore similar demands for the public good. Although
the latter effect has been hypothesized in the literature on both marriage markets and local public
goods, no formal proofs have been provided and no general conditions for the result established.
This paper proves the existence of a kind of "Tiebout equilibrium" (Tiebout, 1956) in marriage
rnarkets by assuming a particular class of utility functions but without making any assumptions
about intra-household istributions of utility or the form of within marriage bargaining.
9 His theoretical results are actually ambiguous on this prediction, but imply negative assortative mating if the
elasticity of labor supply with respect to spouse's wage is negative, a condition Becker argues will generally
hold empirically.
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4. Incorporating the Role of Comparative Advantage
The effects of household public goods can be combined with the effects of comparative advan-
tage by making household full income a more general function of spouses' traits. Suppose that the
household budget constraint is
F(ai, a1) = pY + wX, (24)
where we return to the case in which there is a single price for the private good but make no
assumptions about the relationship between traits and household income. Assuming that utility is
still of form (6), budget constraint (24) implies transferable utility of the same form as the original
model with exogenous income, since utility is linear in the private good. By the same logic as
above, then, any two spouses assigned to each other will maximize joint utility and the equilibrium
assignment of spouses will maximize U1. Replacing I with F(ai, a3) in the expression for joint
utility (7) and the first order condition (9), and noting that the second order condition (10) is
unchanged, the effect of a, on demand for Y is
8Y - A' 8F- --- (25)81 D ai '
which, as above, implies that 8 and A'OF/8ai have the same sign.
Defining V3 = maxy Zia(Y) subject to (24),
0V _Zij 8Y 0Zi- OF
aai Y a aai - ai '(26)
The cross-partial derivative is
(12 V3a eY 82F=A'- +A F(27)
8ai&a 0ai Oai Oa
The first term on the right hand side of (27) is unambiguously non-negative as proven above
for the two previous cases. The term implies that for any trait which influences household full
income, there will always be a force working toward positive assortative mating on that trait as
long as there are household public goods. If the trait also has the property that the higher values
of the trait lower the marginal product of the trait for the other member, then there may also
be a force working in the direction of negative assortative mating, the case originally analyzed by
Becker. This effect is captured in the second term in (27), which now has the possibility of being
negative, capturing Becker's notion of the role of comparative advantage in household production.
If the second term is positive, suggesting that the husband's and wife's traits are complementary,
then the household production effect reinforces the tendency to match persons with similar full
incomes caused by the presence of public goods.
5. Implications of Disparities in Traits for Empirical Analysis
In addition to their direct application to assortative mating in marriage markets, the above
results have implications for the decision of whether or not to combine by any two individuals or
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households, independent of whether there is a complete "market" for household members. Suppose
we are interested, for example, in the effect of individual full incomes on the decision by an elderly
parent and a grown child about whether to form a joint household. Returning to the case in which
iindividuals differ only in exogenous incomes and all goods can be purchased in the market, consider
the erfect of holding the total income of the parent and child constant while increasing the dispersion
in their incomes. If individual preferences can be expressed as form (6), then total household utility
when the parent and child combine is independent of the distribution of income. It follows that the
gross benefit to combining is unaffected by an increase in the dispersion. But it follows directly from
the convexity of the indirect utility function proven in (13) that the combined utility of the parent
and child when living separately must increase as the dispersion in incomes increases. Holding
total income of the potential members of a joint household constant, the net benefits of combining
into a joint household are a strictly decreasing function of the absolute difference in their incomes,
as long as the income elasticity of demand for the public good is not zero. The magnitude of the
decline in the benefits of combining caused by an increase in the dispersion of incomes increases as
the absolute value of the income elasticity of demand for the public good increases.
These theoretical results shed light on the appropriate specification of empirical models of mar-
riage and joint household formation. In particular, they clarify the role of the incomes of potential
household members and the importance of the distribution of income among these members. Let
Zi represent the net benefits for family i of forming a joint household with a given potential match.
To take a concrete example for illustrative purposes, assume that family i refers to parents and
that Zi is the benefits from combining with a family headed by one of their grown children. For
sinplicitiy the analysis will consider the role of family incomes, but the model could be recast in
terms of wages or other characteristics. Represent the benefits of combining as
Z= #I3Ci + 71(Iii + 12i) + 7211i -12i1-+ u;, (28)
where Ili is the natural log of the parents' family income, I2i is the natural log of the child's family
income, C1 ; is a vector of characteristics of the parents, and u; is a normally distributed disturbance
term assumed to be uncorrelated with the other right hand side variables. The use of log income
is a functional form assumption which will be seen below to simplify the solution to the inherent
unobservables problem in (28). Rather than observing Zi directly we observe the indicator variable
Zi,
Zi = 1 if Zi > 0
Z =O0 if Z <O0.
If both I1; and 2; are observed for a sample of families independent of their living arrange-
ments, (28) could be estimated by a conventional probit. Estimates of 71 indicate the income effect
on demand for privacy, with 71 > 0 if privacy is a normal good. The parameter 72 captures the
effect of income disparities between the families on the benefits of extending. In the case of efficient
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households with utility functions of type (6), 72 will be negative if the gains to sharing a household
result from joint consumption economies.
A standard problem of unobservables plagues direct estimation of (28). The income of the
potential joint family is typically only observed for those families who choose to combine, a problem
complicated by the non-linearity of (28). If I1; and I2i entered linearly into (28) the problem could
be handled with a straightforward modification of Heckman's (1974, 1976) solution to the problem
of unobserved wages for women who do not work. What is needed is a second structural equation
describing I2i as a function of characteristics of family i, say
I2 = 3C 2 , + vi, (29)
where C2 ; is a vector of characteristics of family i and u and v are assumed to be bivariate normal
with zero means and covariance matrix
If (28) could be reparameterized as
Zi = #iC1i + a1I1; + a2I2; + ui, (30)
and assuming variables exist to insure identification, consistent estimates could be obtained by full
information maximum likelihood or by a three step procedure in which a reduced form probit is
estimated for (28), a selection bias corrected OLS regression is estimated for (29), and predicted
values of I2i are used in a third stage probit for (28) (Heckman, 1976, Nelson and Olsen, 1978).
Structural equation (28) could be rewritten as (30) if the rankings of the two incomes were the
same for all observations. If I1i > I2i Vi, then ai = 71 +72 and a2 = 71 - 72. If I1i < I2i Vi, then
ai = 71 - 72 and a2 = 1 + 72. It is worth noting that even if I1 , and I 2i were observed for all
households, making probit estimation of (30) straightforward, the interpretation of the parameters
a1 and a2 could be'misleading. Consider a case, for example, in which I1; < I2 Vi, and 72 < 71 < 0.
This implies that a1 > 0 in (30), a result which might be interpreted as implying a positive income
effect on the propensity to form joint households. The positive a1 would actually reflect the fact
that if I1; < I2i, holding I2i constant and raising I1; raises total income but also reduces the
dispersion of incomes. If the effect of reduced dispersion is strong enough, the effect of raising I
could be positive, even though privacy is a normal good as indicated by 71 < 0.
In general, it will be inappropriate to enter the characteristics of individuals as separate linear
variables if behavior depends on the dispersion in the values of the variables. The specific nature
of the mis-specification caused by adopting this commonly used functional form can be seen in the
likelihood function, which will be derived below. The problem with trying to rewrite (28) as (30)
is that it will generally be unreasonable to assume that the ranking of I1; and f2 ; is the same for
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all households. If (30) is estimated on either a complete sample or by using parameter estimates
from (29) to predict I2; for non-joint families, there is no clear interpretation of a1 and a2 in
(30) if the rankings of I1; and I2; vary across households. The estimation problem becomes more
complicated since we now require not simply a prediction of the mean of I2i but also a prediction
of its ranking relative to Ii. Since the ranking depends on the stochastic component of I2i, a
multistage procedure using reduced forms will not be sufficient to provide consistent estimates of
the parameters.
The problem can be interpreted as unknown sample separation in the ranking of the two
incomes for non-joint families. Let the indicator function 6; denote the ranking of I1i and I2,, with
6, = 1 if I1;> I2I and S; = 0 if I1i < I2,. Rewrite (28) as
Zi = #iC1; + 0I1; + a2I2; + u; if 4g = 1 (31)
Z = #i1; +a2hI+ a1I2; +-ui if 6;i= 0, (32)
where ai = 71 +72 and a2 = 71 -72. The likelihood function can be thought of as separating into
four parts corresponding to the four combinations of Z; and 6,. Sample separation on Zi is known
for all observations and sample separation on 6, is known conditional on Z; = 1. If Z; = 0, however,
the value of 6i is unknown, implying that it is unknown whether (31) or (32) is the correct linear
structural equation for a given non-joint family. The problem is directly analogous to problems
of unknown sample separation in market disequilibrium models and the solution takes a similar
form. 10
To see the form of the likelihood function, note first that for those with Zi = 1, the probability
that Z= > 0 can be conditioned on the value of I2i and therefore on the value of 4;:
P[Zz > 0|j; = 1] = P[p3iC 1, + a1 1i + a2I 2i > -uII2 i]
1 rI21 -#iC2; #iC1; + a1I1;+22; .+ (I2; - #2C2i)/a
av av 312
P[Z" > 016i = 0] = P[#iC 1, + a21; + a1I2, > -UiII2i]
1 12, -p#cC2; # C1 ; +02I1i + 01I2i + ou('2i - #6C2i)/13 ,
-0, I v j 12
where 0 and 4 are the density and cumulative respectively of the standardized normal distribution,
and 812 = [u - (au/ 2 )]1/ 2
For observations for which Z; = 0 we do not know whether the benefit of extending is described
by regime (31) or (32). The reason that a standard multistage estimation strategy will not work
is that it is not sufficient to simply predict an expected value for the unobservable I2,. Estimation
requires knowing whether I2, > l1; for each observation, a condition which depends on the stochastic
disturbance term v,. For observations for which Z, = 0, the value of 2i is not observed, so
10 See, for example, Goldfeld and Quandt (1975) and Maddala and Nelson (1974).
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the likelihood function must be written as a function only of observables Ci, C2i, and I1i, the
parameters, and the stochastic disturbances u; and vi:
P[Zi < 01 = P[#lC 1; + a1I1 ; + a2#C 2 ; < -(ui + aiv1 ) and I1s - #f2C2; > vi]
+ P[3(C1; + a2I1 + a1#3iC2 ; < -(ui + a 2v;) and I1; - #32C 2 < vi].
Given the distributional assumption on the disturbances, this can be rewritten as a function of a
standardized bivariate normal distribution, recognizing that v and u+ aiv are jointly normal with
means zero and covariance matrix E1 and that v and u + a2v are jointly normal with means zero
and covariance matrix E2, where
E - Q 2 2 (J - 1, 2 ),
ouv ' j 3j
with a = a2 + aau + 2ajo... Transforming u and v -I- agv (j = 1, 2) into standardized normal
variables, the probability of observing non-joint families is
P[Z = 0] = (c21,d21,p2 )+ 'Z(c 1 ,dii,pi),
where P is the standardized bivariate normal cumulative distribution. The first two arguments
in ((-, -, .) are upper limits of integration, the lower limits of integration are -oo, and the third
argument is the correlation between v and u + ajv, where p = (n, + aso2)I( oia). The upper
limits of integration are
-[#3iC 11 + a2I i+ a1#iC 2i]
ci31ai(33)
-[3#C 1, + 11;+ a2/13 C2i]
c2i
.C32
and
= Iij -(34)
d2; = fl C2; - i;.
The log likelihood fnaction for the entire sample of joint and non--joint families, then, is
14
log L=
I2i - #C2, #gCi + a1 1i + a2I12 +uauv(I2 ; -1#'C2i)/u2 1log# + log 40 -log(7,
z=1 312
b=1
I2 - #C2i(cd )++og (I C1 + a211 + a12:+ ( 2 -#C2i)/)2
+ log 4 + log & -32log o,
a=0
+ E log [4(c2i, d2i, P2) + '(c1, di;, p1)]."
(35)
The likelihood function (35) characterizes the information contributed by the four possible
combinations of Z and 6, taking explicit account of the fact that the value of 6 will be unobserved
when Z = 0. As is customary, only the ratios /3i/c,, 71/0t7, and 712/0u can be recovered, but
these make it possible to test whether privacy is a normal good and the direction of the effect of
dispersion in characteristics.
The empirical model described by (35) is applicable to a wide class of problems in which behav-
ior depends on the dispersion in characteristics among two parties, one of whom is observed only for
particular values of some structural equation. As the theoretical results of this paper demonstrate,
dispersion in characteristics is likely to be an important determinant of household composition
decisions. Researchers who compare the economic behavior of married versus single young adults,
intact elderly couples versus widows, or grown children living at home versus grown children living
alone must consider the role of endogenous household composition choices. While many researchers
have recognized the importance of making household living arrangements endogenous, theoretical
guidance on appropriate empirical specifications has been limited.
When dispersion in unobservable characteristics is important, as the theoretical results from
this paper suggest will often be the case, econometric modeling becomes even more difficult than
conventional problems with unobservables. The results derived here provide a general solution to
these problems, permitting estimation of structural parameters which have straightforward inter-
Iretations in a theoretical model of households formed to capture public good economies.
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